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Early law in the United States did not recognize chil-
dren as individual rights holders independent of their 
parents. The law considered children as wage-earning 
assets of their fathers, in which “their services, earn-
ings and the like became the property of their pa-
ternal masters in exchange for life and maintenance” 
(Woodhouse, 1992: 1037). The nineteenth century 
was marked by, what Stanley Cohen has termed a 
profound “moral panic” concerning gangs of children 
overstepping the confines of childhood and threaten-
ing “societal values and interests” particularly among 
new immigrant communities (Cohen, 1972: 9; Pear-
son, 1985: 63; Davin, 1990). In the late nineteenth 
century, Progressive Era reformers fundamentally 
altered the relationship between the state, the family, 
and the child—no longer did a father wield absolute 
possession and control over his child, and the state 
began to monitor the community’s social investment 
in the child. Reformers sought to “save” children 
from the violence of factories and the street through 
cumpulsory education, welfare reforms, and special-
ized juvenile courts. Seeking to protect and provide 
for this inherently vulnerable population, the court 
began to emphasize children’s rights, which “oper-
ated both as standards for parental behavior and as 
limitations on parental power. Parental failure to 
live up to these standards violated children’s rights 
and justified community intervention” (Woodhouse, 
1992: 1052, cited in Thronson, 2002: 979). Under the 
rubric of the “best interests of the child,” the legal 
principle that still prevails in contemporary juvenile 
courts, the state can intervene directly in family life 
in order to assure appropriate therapeutic interven-
tions for children. Moreover, these historical reforms 
marked a shift in allegiance that remains with us to-
day—a child’s “highest duty was no longer obedience 
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Despite discarded notions of children as property, 
contemporary U.S. immigration law still frames im-
migrant children as objects, recognizing the identity 
of a child only inasmuch as that child is a derivative 
of the actions, legal status, and presence of his or her 
parent(s). The presumption is that adults are the deci-
sion-makers and providers for children. The social po-
sition of the child as inferior or somehow exclusively 
dependent stands in marked contrast to the integral 
roles children often assume in familial decision-mak-
ing processes, as well as the decisions they make as in-
dividual social actors. Nonetheless, to succeed best at 
obtaining legality under the practices of immigration 
law, children must be presented as variables or liminal 
figures within adult-defined worlds. Because children 
are not seen as autonomous individuals from birth, 
but as beings that families must socialize into mature 
adults, children do not maintain an independent re-
lationship to the state (Schneider, 1968). And yet, as 
Glenn convincingly argues, independence is a “key ide-
ological concept anchoring citizenship” manifested in 
rights such as property ownership and voting (Glenn, 
2002: 27). At the same time, the family becomes the 
mediator of the state’s investment in the child as a 
future citizen. Because of this presumed dependence, 
children must rely on their parents as proxies before 
the law, which restricts their access to the state (Jans, 
2004; Leiter, et al., 2006; O’Neil, 1997; Thronson, 2002). 
Consequently, the legal identity of the “unaccompa-
nied alien child”1 is both contingent and dependent: 
an impossible subject who cannot exist in juridical 
1  The U.S. legal code defines “unaccompanied alien children” 
as “illegal aliens” under the age of eighteen who come to the 
United States without authorization or overstay their visas and 
are without a parent or legal guardian. Although many children 
outside of their country of origin are without their parents 
or legal guardians, they may be accompanied by customary 
care providers, extended family, family friends, community 
members, or entrusted to smugglers throughout the duration 
of their journey. Internationally, the more prevalent term 
is “separated children” which, in many ways, more accurately 
reflects the temporary or contingent nature of travel or living 
arrangements of many children. In my research, I choose to 
enlist the juridical term “unaccompanied child” because it is 
a critical intersection between migrant youth, their families, 
and U.S. law. The legal category, constructed though it may be, 
becomes a useful site of inquiry into the ways the law attempts 
to identify and to shape the capabilities and rights of children 
and their relationships to extended kinship networks both in 
the United States and abroad.
accounts of personhood due to his illegal presence in 
the United States and his paradoxical position as an 
alone but dependent minor. Just as Mae Ngai (2004: 
4) argues, a migrant’s illegality is “simultaneously a so-
cial reality and a legal impossibility—a subject barred 
from citizenship and without rights.”
Countering the perception of children as depen-
dent citizens, this article argues that recent changes 
in immigration law once again shift the relationship 
between the state, the family, and the child, position-
ing the state at odds with lived kinship structures and 
forcing youth to choose between the state and exist-
ing kinship ties. In viewing children as undeveloped in 
their autonomy and thereby dependent upon an adult 
(be it parents or the state in loco parentis), immigration 
law does not allow space for thoughtful consideration 
of a child’s agency. In contrast, I argue that a discus-
sion of agency becomes central in the narratives of mi-
grant youth in the ways they cross physical, social and 
metaphoric borders and reside in overlapping spaces 
of impossibility—be it social invisibility, illegality, or 
independence. A unidirectional approach to the study 
of the law’s impact on the lives of youth negates the 
significant contributions youth make as social actors. 
Youth negotiate complex networks of actors and in-
stitutions that may aid them in evading deportation, 
earning income, and contributing to household econo-
mies in the United States and in their home countries 
(Ayotte, 2000; Coutin, 2005; Menjivar, 2001). By exam-
ining their everyday interactions and confrontations 
with these networks, I consider how youth shape the 
very laws that govern their everyday lives.
The nature of agency I discuss above will be ex-
amined through the case study presented here. Over 
an eighteen-month period, I traced the circulation of 
Julio through three geographic locales—in his home-
town in El Salvador, in a federal shelter for unaccom-
panied children in Texas, and at an uncle’s home in 
Maryland—in an effort to understand how unaccom-
panied migrant children negotiate their often con-
flicting identities as child, family member, boyfriend/
girlfriend, student, migrant, economic agent, victim 
of violence, at-risk youth, perceived perpetrator of 
violence, and/or juvenile delinquent. This article is a 
small segment of my doctoral research with migrant 
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children in which I explore the network of actors and 
institutions that emerge when unaccompanied chil-
dren migrate clandestinely from Central America and 
Mexico to the United States. This multisited ethno-
graphy, spanning from Maryland to the sister cities 
of El Paso and Ciudad Juarez to El Salvador to Illinois, 
asks how the juridical category of “unaccompanied 
alien child” recasts relationships between the state, 
youth, and their families. I trace the coherence of this 
category through the complex and not always legible 
decisions of immigration officials, consular officials, 
practices of shelter social workers, attorneys, and 
activists and the narratives of migrant children and 
their families.
Julio’s (in)visibility
When I first met Julio, a lanky youth of fifteen, he 
was dressed in a neon blue sweat shirt with matching 
pants and black, plastic flipflops provided to him by 
the federal shelter where he resided. In the El Paso 
heat of early summer, Julio incessantly wiped the 
sweat from his brow onto his right sleeve. The shel-
ter’s director explained that the florescent-colored 
clothing—red, blue, yellow, and green—allowed staff 
to easily identify children who attempted to escape 
the federal shelter where they were detained. The 
sandals were also standard-issue flip-flops thought 
to deter fast-footed children from getting very far 
along the gravel road connecting the shelter to the 
highway. The shelter is one of thirty-six federal shel-
ters (at the time) in which the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Re-
settlement (ORR) subcontracts nongovernmental or-
ganizations to provide housing and social services to 
unaccompanied or trafficked children apprehended 
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 
formerly known as Immigration and Naturalization 
Services.
At the time, the convoluted network of four gov-
ernment departments, fifteen federal government 
agencies, and myriad nongovernmental organi-
zations involved in the care and custody of appre-
hended unaccompanied children (Bhabha & Schmidt, 
2006) was indecipherable to Julio. In his mounting 
frustration with his “captivity” at the shelter, Julio 
remarked, “I am ashamed that I got caught. I made 
my decision, had everything organized, had my plan, 
and now what? I am trapped here in this place. My 
debt is increasing as I sit here wasting my time learn-
ing geography. They must think I’m stupid. I walked 
their geography.”2
While in his hometown of Santa Ines, El Salvador, 
Julio’s reputation as a talented student and respon-
sible worker had brought him school awards for ex-
cellence and stable employment as a dishwasher and 
as an occasional carpenter; but it also brought him 
to the attention of the Joker. The Joker was the local 
Mara Salvatrucha (also known as MS-13) gang leader, 
whose first contact with Julio was to demand the new 
tennis shoes that Julio purchased with his earnings. 
Later, demands came for his girlfriend and his par-
ticipation in gang activities. Each threat was met with 
Julio’s firm and sometimes-belligerent refusals, refus-
als that belied how scared he really was. “I am not in-
terested in your babosada,”3 he told them. On three 
occasions, several gang members beat Julio, with the 
Joker directing each blow. They would wait for Julio 
outside of school, his place of work, and even church 
on Sundays. At times, Julio left through an alternate 
door, climbed a fence behind the school, or ran to 
escape these confrontations, but often this occurred 
without success. “It was hard to hide from them,” Ju-
lio remarked on his efforts to avoid gang members in 
his community. “I am taller than most people in my 
town. It is kind of hard for me to blend in.”
Julio typically contributed to his family’s food 
and schooling expenses for six younger siblings. His 
two elder sisters had limited capacity to contribute to 
the household’s needs, while Julio’s stepfather’s in-
termittent employment as a truck driver varied with 
2 I conducted all interviews in either Spanish or English. 
Translations are my own, highlighting in some instances 
Spanish words of particular force or interest. While detained, 
children receive daily instruction in the English language. At 
the time of my initial interview with Julio, one of the shelter 
teachers was introducing the geography of Central America 
and Mexico to detainees. In later conversations with Julio, he 
would detail with great specificity the route he traveled from 
El Salvador to the United States. Hence, he literally “walked 
their geography.”
3  Stupidity or crap.
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the demand for timber from neighboring Honduras, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua. When not working, his 
stepfather also had corresponding bouts of heavy 
drinking and verbal and physical abuse. After a par-
ticularly brutal beating in which the Joker and three 
of his fellow gang members broke Julio’s arm, Julio 
stopped attending school and work, only leaving the 
house once in six weeks to remove his cast. “I tried 
to become invisible,” he explained. He slept most of 
the day or watched Hollywood films on a small televi-
sion set in the living room, able for the most part to 
avoid the gaze of his stepfather who, fortunately, was 
working during this period and away from the home 
for several weeks at a time. Gang members would 
regularly pass his home and yell threats through the 
windows. On one occasion, the Joker knocked on the 
door. When Julio’s mother answered, she said Julio 
had left for the United States—a decision Julio had 
been contemplating for several months. Julio re-
called this period of hiding: “There was nothing for 
me there. I could not work; I could not study; I could 
not protect my mom from my stepfather or even my-
self. I had to hide to survive; that is no way to live.”
After six weeks of retreat, Julio and his mother 
began discussing his journey to the United States. 
She had located a distant uncle of Julio’s who had 
moved eight years previously to Silver Spring, Mary-
land, and she called on Julio’s behalf requesting help. 
Julio’s uncle agreed to secure him employment and 
provide him a place to live if he could get to Maryland 
on his own. Julio borrowed US$6000 from a local 
police officer for whom he had done some carpentry 
work but who could not provide him protection from 
the MS-13’s recruitment apparatus. The police officer 
introduced Julio to his brother, a broker for coyotes 
who smuggled migrants through Guatemala and 
Mexico into the United States. Julio’s $3000 down 
payment assured him passage to the U.S.-Mexico 
border, or so he thought.
spACes of liMinAlity, 
invisibility And MoveMent 
into the JuridiCAl spACe
His departure from Santa Ines marked Julio’s en-
trance into a liminal period of transit, whereby he 
was devoid of the protection of the police, the gang, 
his family, and the Salvadoran and U.S. governments. 
He journeyed for three weeks—by bus through Gua-
temala, by car and by train through Mexico, and 
eventually by foot into the United States. The success 
of Julio’s journey was predicated upon his hiding his 
physical presence—in ditches along the road, on top 
of trains, in the back of vans—as well as his language. 
He rarely spoke for fear of passersby detecting his 
Salvadoran accent and vocabulary. “I imagined I was 
a superhero in a comic book, you know, who had the 
power to make himself invisible. No one could see me. 
I never spoke. It is like I wasn’t even there. Besides, it 
all seems like a bad nightmare now. I try not to think 
about it. It never really happened.” Julio entered an-
other dimension, be it liminal or science fictional, to 
absent himself while in transit (Coutin, 2005). Susan 
Coutin (2005: 195) analyzes how “clandestinity” is a 
public secret, a known social reality in which unau-
thorized migrants must be “absent from the spaces 
they occupy.” For unauthorized migrants arriving in 
the United States, the law becomes a mechanism by 
which the state may absent those that are present 
through the prohibition of unauthorized entrance 
or through the denial of certain rights and services. 
The state may also physically absent, via detention or 
deportation, those that are unlawfully living within 
national borders (Coutin, 2005: 196).
Upon crossing the territorial boundary between 
the United States and Mexico, Julio also entered into 
a new juridical space (Ngai, 2004: 6). Julio shifts his 
principal legal identity from a citizen of El Salvador 
to an illegal alien with limited access to rights and 
services in the United States. As Ngai argues, how-
ever, the boundary between citizen and illegal is soft, 
where forms of illegality are ironically recognized by 
the state in some circumstances. “[I]llegal alienage is 
not a natural or fixed condition but the product of 
positive law; it is contingent and at times unstable. 
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The line between legal and illegal status can be crossed 
in both directions” (Ngai, 2004: 6). Under some condi-
tions, such as Temporary Protected Status or certain 
types of visas, an individual can transform his illegal 
status to legal, just as an individual with legal status 
in the United States can lose his status through com-
mitting certain crimes (Ngai, 2004: 6). Kitty Calavita 
(1998) adds that not only does the law create illegality, 
but in the case of Spanish immigration law, it actively 
“regularizes and ‘irregularizes’ people, by making it all 
but impossible to retain legal status over time . . . the 
boundaries between legal and illegal populations are 
porous and in constant flux, as people routinely move 
in and out of legal status” (Calavita, 1998: 531).
Within three days of crossing the border by foot 
near McAllen, Texas, Border Patrol agents appre-
hended Julio en route to Houston. They interrogated 
him for two hours and held him for eight days in a 
small cell with six other migrants. Eventually, because 
of his age and his presence without a legal guardian, 
Julio was transferred to an ORR shelter for unaccom-
panied children. Analogous to the legal space of air-
ports, ORR shelters are simultaneously located within 
and outside of national territories. Unaccompanied 
children are held betwixt and between in federal shel-
ters that are geographically within United States ter-
ritory but without access to the rights and services 
afforded to citizens (Turner, 1967). Unaccompanied 
children are confined to federal shelters much longer 
than their counterparts in the domestic child welfare 
system because they lack the proper documentation 
to enter into national spaces.
in loCo pArentis
The state defines and positions unaccompanied 
youth largely through the law, whether by legislat-
ing citizenship, labor, or eligibility for government 
programs (Garcia, 2006; Hagan, 1994; Orellana, et al., 
2001). It is important to note that immigration law 
does not provide any child-specific accomodations 
customary in family and juvenile courts for citizens. 
Unaccompanied children do not have a right to state-
funded attorneys but must secure and pay for their 
own representation during immigration proceedings; 
unlike children in state courts, there is no “best-in-
terest” legal standard taking into acount the safety 
and well-being of the child in immigration law; yet 
the rules of evidence remain the same for children 
and adults, forcing children to meet the same bur-
dens of evidence and testimony as adults.
Recent shifts in immigration law for unaccompa-
nied children have begun to guarantee some measure 
of legal relief for minors through the introduction of 
Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status. SIJ is a step 
in immigration law towards the identification of un-
accompanied minors by permitting undocumented 
children to stand before the law as primary petition-
ers in cases of abuse, neglect, or abandonment. While 
SIJ has existed since the early 1990s, advocates have 
increasingly utilized this tool in the last five years. 
While in many ways it is consistent with immigra-
tion law’s view that children are necessarily depen-
dent, SIJ does open a critical window through which 
advocates have begun to push for expanded rights of 
children and a more nuanced perspective on migrant 
children. It is the only provision within immigration 
law that considers the best interests of the child, cre-
ating a unique hybrid of state courts and federal im-
migration law, which provides certain undocumented 
children with an avenue to citizenship. The mecha-
nism of the best-interest standard with the SIJ peti-
tion is one of the only ways by which the voice of the 
child figures into immigration proceedings. Children 
claiming SIJ, however, must legally sever kinship ties 
and become dependents of the state.
In order to remain in the United States, the most 
viable legal option for Julio was to petition for a Spe-
cial Immigrant Juvenile Visa in which Julio had to 
detail how his father abandoned him at a young age, 
the abuse he and his siblings received at the hands of 
his stepfather and that his mother could not or chose 
not to protect him. In effect, Julio had to publicly 
claim that he was “abused, neglected, or abandoned” 
by his family—a claim that, according to Julio, was 
not only emotionally inaccurate but also undermined 
his personal and financial commitment to his mother 
and siblings. “I just can’t say those bad things abut 
my family to a room of people, to a judge. You just do 
not do that. They are my family.” According to Julio’s 
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former employer in Santa Ines, the physical abuse 
was public knowledge but something not discussed 
or addressed publicly. He said, “It [domestic violence] 
happens. We know it happens but it is a family affair. 
Julio never said anything to me, but I knew what was 
going on. We all knew.”
The Special Immigrant Juvenile status is a form of 
legal relief that embraces the traditional binaries in 
which a child can either exist as part of a family or as 
wholly independent. If a child is seen as independent 
or abandoned by his family, the state affixes itself as 
the parent of the child victim. With SIJ, Julio forfeits 
any right to petition for his mother or siblings to im-
migrate. Further, since an SIJ recipient is “no longer 
the ‘child’ of an abusive parent, the CIS [U.S. Citizen-
ship and Immigration Services] may assert that he 
or she no longer has any sibling relationship with 
brothers and sisters” (Kinoshita & Brady, 2005: 9). As 
such, SIJ suffers from a legal aconsanguinity in which 
“immigration policies nullify legal legitimacy of some 
kinship ties” (Coutin, 2000: 32–3; De Genova, 2002: 
427).4 In Julio’s situation, the state exists at odds with 
his actual family structure, legislating the space of 
the family by forcing him to choose between the state 
(and partial citizenship) and existing kinship ties.
A Question of AgenCy
Anthropologists have traced the emergence of mul-
tiple youth identities shaped by social and political 
forces, yet there is a distinct neglect of how youth 
shape these same processes. What do youth do with 
this “agency”? How do youth interpret, navigate, 
shape, and re-invent relationships and customs, 
4  Although a child granted SIJ could apply for a sibling, she 
must first become a naturalized U.S. citizen, which requires 
a five-year waiting period following his or her adjustment of 
status to a Legal Permanent Resident, and must be over the 
age of 21 before she can apply for her sibling(s) to immigrate 
to the United States. Currently, there is a ten-year backlog 
for sibling petitions of U.S. citizens. Immigration law is very 
clear that a child granted SIJ cannot petition for her parent, 
stating “no natural parent of prior adoptive parent of any alien 
provided special immigrant status under this subparagraph 
shall thereafter, by virtue of such parentage be accorded any 
right, privilege, or status under this chapter” [INA 101 § 27 (J)
(iii)(II)].
and how are youth shaped by them? How do youth 
conceive of their social worlds, and what can adults 
learn from these perspectives? Prout (2005) claims 
that, although the empirical research on child agency 
is robust, there is minimal literature that moves be-
yond description. This speaks to how discussions of 
youth agency are consistently unidirectional—youth 
respond to or work against social structures, instead 
of actively shaping these same processes through their 
everyday interactions. For example, while focusing on 
the “agency” of youth as they assimilate global capi-
talism, transnational processes, and local culture, the 
anthropology of youth disproportionately centers on 
consumer practices and popular culture, such as the 
consumption of romance novels (Christian-Smith, 
1987), fashion (Talbot, 1995), and clothing styles (Dim-
itriadis, 2001; Gondola, 1999). While these studies at-
tempt to contextualize the lives of youth by focusing 
on how globalization and modernity shape cultural 
practices of youth in local contexts (Dirlik, 2001; Soja, 
1989), few ethnographies allow for a mutually consti-
tutive framework in which youth both incorporate 
global forces into local practices and influence the 
ways in which these forces are constituted and cir-
culated beyond consumer preferences and practices. 
This essay seeks to challenge this analytic approach 
through the incorporation of the law as exemplary of 
the interdependence of the lives of youth such as Julio, 
especially at the center of global phenomena such as 
migration.
The quickly growing network of Office of Refugee 
Resettlement shelters for unaccompanied children 
might suggest that the law has begun to recognize the 
social agency of an entrepreneurial youth who orches-
trates his or her own transnational journey, although 
the bureaucratic processes and institutional practices 
are predicated exclusively on children as undeveloped 
and dependent upon adults. More frequently, the law 
and lawlike processes frame agency in terms of de-
linquency, perhaps a contributing factor in why gang-
based asylum claims, that Julio might also have pur-
sued, have limited success. As Julio’s pro bono attorney 
remarked: “In immigration court, child abuse is more 
palatable than gangs.” Another advocate specializing 
in gang-based asylum claims concurs: “If you have a 
client who comes into the courtroom with muscles, 
visible tattoos or even just a bad attitude, you will 
have an extremely difficult time convincing the judge 
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that your client is sufficiently sympathetic and de-
serving of asylum. However irrelevant to your legal 
claim, your client must play into a more sympathetic 
image of the victim—docile, quiet, and sufficiently 
fearful.” In contrast to his state-issued sweat suits 
and sandals, which marked Julio as a prisoner, Ju-
lio’s attorney also sought to physically and symboli-
cally dress him as a sympathetic child victim, worthy 
of the court’s sympathies.
In tandem with an analysis of the ways legal and 
lawlike processes position migrant youth at the inter-
section of the family and the state comes an impera-
tive to also focus on how youth like Julio negotiate, 
evade, and at times resist this normative position-
ing in their everyday interactions. While the law at-
tempts to restrict or to deny the agency of children, 
the presence of unaccompanied children has spawned 
specialized governmental and nongovernmental pro-
grams, the emergence of “children’s judges” and “chil-
dren’s attorneys,” “children’s dockets” for detained 
children, legal theories on child-specific persecution 
claims and has even generated new laws. By reading 
agency back into the law, we may see how the law 
functions in the daily lives of youth. Analyzing youth 
discourses on, confrontations with, or perceptions 
of the law will not only validate youth as important 
social actors warranting serious academic study but 
also will demonstrate how the law is interdependent 
with social subjects.
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